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PROGRESS OF THELAW.
As MARKED BY DECIsIONs SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ACCIDENT INSURANCE.
The preValence of accident insurance policies makes the
decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Travelers'
Passenger Ins. Co. v. Austin, 42 S. E. 522, of special inter-
est. In that case it is held that a paymaster of a
railroad company traveling upon business of the company
from station to station on the line of the company, and
stopping between stations for the purpose of paying off
employes of the company wherever they may be, is not, while
so d6ing, a "passenger," within the meaning of a dlause in
a policy of accident insurance granting double indemnity
to the insured if injured while riding as a passenger on a
passenger car using steam as a motive power; A coach
specially equipped and used as a pay car, and not a vehicle
for the transportation of passengers, is not, in contempla-
tion of the contract alluded to above a passenger car,
although it had formerly been used as a passenger car, and
was capable of being so used again. See Berliner v. Insur-
ance Co., 53 Pac. 922.
ATTORNEYS.
A contract by an attorney for a contingent fee, where
it is not champertous and the costs are to be paid and are
c.ti.gent paid, by the client, is valid, both under the Penn-
Fee sylvania decisions and those of the federal
courts: U. S. Circuit Court (E. D., Pennsylvania) in
Muller v. Kelly, i16 Fed. 545. The champertous contract
seems to be in the view of the court a contract where the
costs and expenses are agreed .to be paid by the attorney; it
being permissible to make a contract for sharing the verdict
in a certain ratio. See and compare with each other and
with this case: Ball v. Halsell, i6i U. S. 8o, and Peck v.
Henrich, 167 U. S. 624. For the Pennsylvania decision,
see Perry v. Dicken, 105 Pa. 83..
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BANKRUPTCY.
The U. S. District Court (E. D., Pehnsylvania) holds
In re Mercur, i i6 Fed. 655, that where all the members of
Partnershi a firm are adjudicated bankrupts, but there has
P been no adjudication against the firm, the trus-
tee appointed in the individual cases has no authority to inter-
fere with firm assets, though all the cases were instituted
simultaneously by the same creditor, and the same trustee
appointed for all the partners. The court decides that in the
contemplation of the Bankrupt Act of 1898, a partnership
is a distinct entity, which requires a petition specifically di-
rected against it, alleging an act of bankruptcy in which it is
expressly involved, and resulting in an adjudication against
the partnership itself, irrespective of and in addition to any
that may be made against the individual members; and
simultaneous proceedings against the individual members
of a partnership do not necessarily bring the partnership into
court, so as to authorize an amendment calling for an adju-
dication against it. See Amsinck v. Bean, 22 Wall. 395.
BILLS AND NOTS.
In Coleman v. Cole, 69 S. W. 692, the Court of Appeals
at St. Louis, Mo., holds that where a promissory note,
usurious as between the original parties, is dis-charged by a new note at a lawful rate of inter-
est, which is received in payment of the old Qne, extending
the time of the loan, and introducing a new party as maker
of the second note, the usury of the first note is no bar to
the enforcement of a chattel mortgage executed to secure
the last note. Compare Coleman v. White, 69 Mo. App.
530.
CARLIERS.
A passenger on a street car line on which the company
,issued transfers to its various connecting lines received from
Street the conductor a transfer to a line other than
"iways, the line to which he had requested one. Not
Trafers noticing the mistake (apparently the transfer
showed on its face that it was not good over the line desired,
though the case does not state this except by inference) he
presented it to the conductor on the line to which he had
requested a transfer, who refused to accept it. The passen-
ger declined to pay further fare and was ejected. Under
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these facts the Supreme Court of Washington holds that the
passenger was under no obligation to make a technical ex-
amination of the transfer slip, and since the company was
responsible for the mistake of its agent, it was liable in sub-
stantial damages for the breach of contract occasioned
thereby, though the conductor called upon to correct the
mistake was not the one who had made it: Lanshe v. Tacoma
Ry. & Power Co., 70 Pac. 118. See O'Rorcke v. Railway
Co., 52 S. W. 872, and notice as taking a different view of
facts very similar: Frederick v. M. H. & 0. R. Co., 37
Mich. 342.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in Phelps v.
Windsor Steamboat Co., 42 S. E. 335, that the lessor of a
Injuryto steamboat, not being a quasi public corporation,
Passenger, having received -no special privileges or benefits
Liability of from the state, is not liable for injury to a
Lessor passenger from the negligence of the lessee.
The lease was to a company, of Which Branning was presi-
dent. "No liability," it is said, "attaches to said Branning,
because he was president of said company, unless it were
alleged and shown that the lease was collusive and colorable
only, and a sham to avoid personal liability, and that he had
in fact leased his own property to himself."
CLOUD ON TITLE.
The general rule that where the complainant's title to
real estate is a legal one, he must be in possession in order
Posession to maintain a suit in equity to remove a cloud
on title, is well established. In Clem v. Mese-
role, 32 Southern, 783, the Supreme Court of Florida .holds
that an exception to this rule exists where the land is wild,
unimproved, and so unoccupied as not to destroy the con-
structive possession that -follows the legal title; and the bill
must allege such possession, or such unoccupied condition of
the land, otherwise it is subject to demurrer for want of
equity.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In Vermont a statute prohibits foreign insurance cor-
porations from doing business in the state, unless they have
Privileges and filed certain statements with the Secretary of
Immunities State and have had a license issued to them
pursuant to a section which requires that the agents through
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whom the business is transacted shall be residents of the
state. The Supreme Court in Cook v. Howland, 52 Atl.
973, holds these provisions constitutional. A corporation,
not being a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution
of the United States in Article IV § 2 and Amend. XIV,
§ i, it is held that the state had the right to, impose the con-
ditions on foreign insurance companies imposed by the
statute, and had also the right, as incidental to the enforce-
ment of such conditions, to prohibit such companies from
doing business through any but resident agents, though
citizens of another state were thereby entirely excluded from
doing such business in the state. See, in connection with
this case, People v. Formosa, 52 Atl..974.
CONTRA:CTS.
A contract by which A. agrees to use the influence of his
newspaper to-secure B.'s nomination for a political office is
Public Policy void, as against public policy: Supreme Court
of Vermont in Livingston v. Page, 52 Atl. 965.
The illegality proceeds from its proximate relation to the
election to the political office. "A newspaper is understood
to present the views of some one connected with its manage-
ment or views deemed consistent with some settled policy,
and has a patronage and influence which are due to that
understanding. As long as the editorial column is relied
.upon as a public teacher and adviser, there can be no more
dangerous deception than that resulting from the secret pur-
chase of its favor." Compare Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt.
546.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
In Grainger v. Erwin, 91 N. W. 592, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska holds that a sale made by an insolvent debtor to
Payment of one of his creditors in payment of a pre-existing
* Debt debt will not be held void merely because the
creditor had notice of ah intent upon the part of the debtor
to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, provided the con-
veyance does not cover more property than is reasonably
necessary to discharge the indebtedness existing. In order
to avoid such a sale it is not sufficient to show that the
creditor merely desired to secure his own debt. It must be
shown that he participated in the fraudulent intent of his
grantor. See Chase v. Walters, 28 Iowa, 460, and Bank v.
Carter, 38 Pa. 446.
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TRUSTS.
In re Totten, 77 N. Y. Supp. 928, it appeared that a de-
positor had eight or ten accounts in a savings bank, largely
Evidence, in excess in amount to what any one person
savings Bank could lawfully deposit on interest in one such
Deposit - bank, and though these accounts were nominally
in trust the depositor had at all times treated them as her
own. The N. Y. Surrogate's Court (Kings county) holds
that notwithstanding the form of the deposit, no trust arises.
See In re Mueller, 15 App. Div. 67, where it was held that
an account opened substantially in this manner "constitutes
an unequivocal declaration of trust in favor of the benefi-
ciary," and compare the views of the Court of Appeals in
Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421.
USURY.-
The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in McCall v. Her-
ring, 42 S. E. 468, that the taking of interest at the highest
Time La legal rate, in advance, by way of discount on
short loans, in the ordinary course of business,
is not usurious; but a reservation of interest in advance in
an ordinary transaction of lending, and borrowing money,
for a period of five years, is usurious when the amount
reserved and the amount contracted to be paid aggregate a
sum which is in excess of the highest legal rate for the term
of the loan. See, for a very able opinion bearing upon this
question, Clarke v. Howard, I i I Ga. 242.
WILLS.
In re Frost's Will, 77 N. Y. Supp. 879, it appeared that a
testatrix executed a will in March, 1897, and another in
Republication - September of the same year, and in April, I9OO,
on a separate sheet annexed to the March will,
she executed a codicil, not referring to either will, but simply
appointing a guardian for her grandchildren, which appoint-
ment was invalid, because their parents were living. The
Surrogate's Court of Kings County holds that the codicil
does not republish the March will as of the date of the
codicil. The court, therefore grants probate to the Septem-
ber will. See and compare In re Campbell's Will, 170
N. Y. 84.
